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Abstract  
 
Competition among cities for mobile capital in the 21st century has intensified. 
Urban hierarchy of a region is undergoing transformation, where economic fortunes 
vary markedly among different localities. In China, these global forces and regional 
restructures have caused a relative economic decline of some historically powerful 
cities, and have also brought about the emergence of new economic centres. In 
response to these forces, many Chinese cities have been driven into adopting a series 
of new competitive strategies, which seek to win back and build up their leading 
positions and competitiveness. To translate these strategies into concrete actions, local 
governments have promoted high profile and face-lifting projects and investments. 
The extensive new urban development in Guangzhou is a particularly interesting case. 
As the provincial capital of the Guangdong Province, and a historically central city in 
the Pearl River Delta Region, Guangzhou’s importance has recently declined. This 
paper attempts to reveal the general strategies and specific projects initiated by 
Guangzhou as important promotion devices in its revitalization program, and to 
examine the rationales behind them. The ambitious new strategies could most likely 
happen under the ‘soft budget constraint’ syndrome in China, and these strategies 
could be risky. Although how much these strategies actually do stimulate business 
and lure investment is yet to be seen, the citizens are immediately and directly 
benefiting from them, and thus, they have gained much popularity and support. 
However, the competitiveness building in Chinese cities has called into question the 
legitimacy of local state governance, and the validity of large projects that lack 
financial disciplines, social objectives, and accountability for unsuccessful 
investments. 
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Introduction 
 
Globalization has been commonly identified as a strong and growing force in 
re-shaping the production and commercial activities in cities today. The global 
restructuring has generated a new regime of capital accumulation, with significant 
policy implications for various localities. At the international level there has been a 
global shift of industrial capital from developed countries to the less developed world 
(Dicken, 2003). At the national and regional level, traditional economic cores have 
been outshined by emerging new space economies, such as “edge cities” (Garreau, 
1991) and “new industrial districts” (Scott, 1988). At the city level, the local order is 
subject to fundamental restructuring in a period when footloose capital is no longer 
tied to traditional urban economies (Short et al., 1993). Further down the hierarchy, 
economic fortunes contrast markedly with the attraction of new capital investment 
varying over space and city (Short et al., 1993: 207). 
 
One important consequence is a growing trend, “towards greater (urban) 
entrepreneurialism, more intense inter-urban competition and the conscious 
promotion of place-specific development strategies” (Parkinson and Harding, 1995: 
67; Harvey, 1989). Competition becomes so intense and inherent in local 
development that cities have to take a more entrepreneurial stance in order to remain 
at the top of a region, and enhance its attraction to the footloose capital, residents, and 
visitors (e.g. Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 1998). The effects of this change have large policy 
implications. A number of new forms of urban governance, such as 
entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989), “new urban politics” (Cox, 1995), “growth 
machine” (Logan and Molotch, 1987), and “urban regime” (Stoker, 1995) have 
emerged. Cities have adopted pro-growth strategies through “place marketing or 
promotion” (Kotler et al., 1990), “civic boosterism” (Ashworth and Voogd, 1990), 
prestige projects (Loftman and Nevin, 1996), or mega events (Hiller, 2000). It seems 
that capitalist cities are keen on adopting risk-taking and profit-motivated strategies to 
promote local and economic growth through active pursuit of infrastructure projects 
for attracting private investment.  
 
Entrepreneurial strategies are also identified in post-socialist cities in the 
climate of inter-city competition (Herrschel, 1998; Young and Kaczmarek, 1999; Wu, 
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2000a, 2000b). However, there are many variations among different cities in the 
contexts and rationales behind the development of such strategies and how they are 
implemented. This is particularly relevant to countries like China, where, as argued by 
Wu (2000a: 349), the entrepreneurial governance is constrained by the legacy of state 
socialism and the strong involvement of the state in the formulation and 
implementation of local development strategies. For instance, despite local 
governments becoming “entrepreneurial” in nature (Walder, 1995; Duckett, 1998), 
they are still under soft budget constraints, under which any possible loss of 
investment is not a matter of life and death because they can often be spared in one 
way or another from any loss making behaviour. To make things worse, because local 
governments are not real business firms per se, they do not have to go into bankruptcy 
even when local finances collapse (Zhao and Zhang, 2002). This has created a 
tendency of over-spending and unwise investment, regardless of capital cost (Jing and 
Zou, 2003). Because of this, local state investment has called into question the 
validity of large projects lacking financial discipline and the unenforceability of loss-
making threats. Under such circumstances, in which investment activities are 
undergone without sufficient consideration of genuine demand, bona fide financial 
capacity, and even capital cost, the “entrepreneurial nature” of local state may only 
exist in form but not in essence. The problem is also exacerbated by the 
commercialization of local financiers (Jing and Zou, 2003) and the dominance of 
government elites in decision making. These elites are more often than not urban 
boosters, advocating pro-growth strategies for both economic growth and their own 
career advancement. As a result, the rampant imitation, redundant construction, and 
speculations in Chinese cities, under the “snakes-and-ladders” game of inter-urban 
competition, are not uncommon. These observations inject a fresh counter argument 
in the predominant assertion that Chinese local governments now act like firms in 
developing business activities (e.g. Walder, 1995; Duckett, 1998; Wu, 2002). Yet, 
reforms have led to the creation of a more ‘entrepreneurial local state’ in the sense 
that the ‘state’ itself is a market player and can even use market instruments to 
achieve hidden political agendas. These features can be called major characteristics of 
an entrepreneurial state. However, reforms like ‘scaling down the government’ do not 
necessarily lead to the hardening of budget constraints of the local state. Rather, the 
local state becomes a ‘unique’ market player, who does not care much about capital 
cost and market demand. Thus, true ‘entrepreneurialism’ is questionable. This paper 
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develops this argument by showing how soft-budget constraint makes the local state 
not so ‘entrepreneurial’ in nature. More specifically, it shows how the state, lacking 
financial and social disciplines, goes beyond its budgetary constraints and social 
responsibilities to recklessly mobilize market resources for urban infrastructure 
development and its own political objectives.  
 
Under these specific circumstances, three issues need to be addressed for a 
deeper understanding of the “repositioning behaviors” of many Chinese cities and 
their corresponding development strategies. First, what are the urban strategies 
preferred by local governments under intensive inter-city competition, and what are 
the rationales in adopting these strategies? Second, what are the urban impacts of 
these strategies and in what way do they contribute to urban transformation in the 
context afore specified? In particular, do they actually stimulate business, lure 
investment, and transform the economy for ‘repositioning’ purposes? Whatever the 
urban impact, there is increased awareness that the large property projects, in general, 
are vehicles for the materialization of development strategies and urban 
transformation in China (Wu, 1999). Physically, the substantial land and fiscal 
demands of these projects have typically resulted in some form of permanent 
alterations to the urban environment because they are often linked to massive land 
encroachment (Yeh and Li, 1999), inner city renewal (Gaubatz, 1999), and new area 
development (Yeh and Wu, 1996). From an urban governance perspective, since it is 
financially not feasible for local governments alone to undertake large projects, they 
have to rely on non-public investors (Wu, 1999). This encourages the building of 
coalitions based on money-generating sectors such as property. Sociologically 
speaking, large projects may lead to social conflicts as a result of the diversion of 
scare public sector resources away from welfare-related needs (e.g. education) to 
face-lifting projects, from the displacement of existing populations and land use 
functions, to accommodate ambitions of the local state. This problem is directly 
related to the third issue, which is: how are large projects justified by the local state to 
gain much popularity and support? Developing these projects are ideas of the local 
elite, who will ultimately utilize public resources, sometimes at the expense of 
affected residents.  
 
 4
These issues also point to a critical question about the role of the state in urban 
development. To understand market reform as a complete retreat of state power from 
economic and social life would be too simplistic (Wu, 2002). From a political 
economy stance, any given city can be conceived as the spatial expression of a variety 
of interests. The state, as one of the significant interests, always plays a major role in 
constituting economies, no matter how ‘free’ an economy may be (Block, 1994). In 
the United State’s capitalist economy, the urban growth machine also captures urban 
government for dominant economic interests in many American cities. The theory 
interprets cities as places where coalitions of landowners, developers, and other 
interests, with a direct stake in the urban development, are strongly motivated to see 
their shared interests and to drive the urban ‘growth machine’ to benefit their own 
fortune building (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Molotch, 1990). Formation of coalition 
politics underlies many other discourses, and takes on various forms (e.g. urban 
entrepreneurialism, urban regime, growth coalition and new urban politics). These 
discourses suggest a state becoming increasingly preoccupied with the exploration of 
new ways in which to foster and encourage local development in a highly pluralist 
society, with strong social mobility power. They have immense appeal to Chinese 
scholars (e.g. Zhu, 2004) in the analysis of China’s urban politics and local economic 
development, as they might shed light on the emerging governance in China: the role 
of state as regulator and player ‘mobilizing and governing the market’. But how far 
does the Chinese local state deviate from discourses originating from free markets in 
advanced capitalism?  This paper will attempt to answer this question, too. 
 
Currently, there is a vast amount of literature pertinent to urban development 
in China, but very few focus on investment behaviors of local state and how these 
behaviors construct urban outcomes. Investment behaviors of Chinese local state are 
large project oriented, and have immense implications for urban change. This paper 
fills in the current academic gap by examining issues (e.g. the role of local state 
rationales and the outcome of new strategies) raised in this section, and contributes to 
a deeper understanding of local politics and urban growth in China, in both theoretical 
and practical terms.  
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Competitiveness and competitive strategies 
 
Despite of the ongoing worldwide debate on whether or not cities compete 
with one another (e.g. Krugman, 1996; Begg, 1999), Porter’s competitive city 
concept (Porter, 1995, 1998) is one of the most influential discourses (e.g. Wang et 
al., 2001). In this concept, cities do compete with one another. Every location – 
whether a nation, region, or city – has a set of unique local conditions that underpin 
the ability of companies based there to compete in a particular field (Porter 1998: 
380). City-level competition does not fundamentally differ from operating at the 
national level. The “diamond” model1 is just as relevant to smaller geographic areas. 
This argument reinforces the idea that the local socio-economic environment is an 
indispensable source of growth dynamics. Competitiveness of a locality is thus 
determined by indigenous rather than external factors. This exerts great policy 
implications for various localities worldwide. The notion of cities as competing 
entities has now been widely accepted (e.g. Begg, 1999; Kresl and Singh, 1999; 
Cheshire, 1999). However, there is little agreement on what constitutes the 
“competitiveness” of cities and how local policy should aim to enhance it. Porter has 
emphasized productivity, formation of clustering, technological leadership, and 
public-private partnership in a locality’s competitiveness (Porter, 1998). 
Competitiveness is also discussed in relation to new industries (Fagerberg, 1996); 
physical, human, and institutional capital (Begg, 1999); and sound economic growth 
with the ability to sustain the position in the urban hierarchy (Kresl and Singh, 1999). 
 
The supply-side factors that contribute to a competitive urban economy have 
affirmed the role of policy action by governments in building competitiveness. 
Specifically, many city administrations have shifted from redistribution and provision 
to a more proactive entrepreneurial stance (Harvey, 1989; Fainstein, 1994; Loftman 
and Nevin, 1996; Begg, 1999). Cities are under increasing pressure to pursue effective 
competitive strategies if they are to prosper. Often used tactics combine the traditional 
property-oriented growth pattern, such as investment in projects with key control, and 
command functions in high finance, government, and information in the context for 
desired city status (e.g. airports, ports, and other related facilities to improve the 
quality of place) (Harvey, 1989; Loftman and Nevin, 1996; Fainstein, 1994). New city 
marketing schemes also orient both to image building and repackaging the ‘place 
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product’ by emphasising the uniqueness of local identity (Kotler, et al., 1990; 
Ashworth and Voogd, 1990; Wilson, 1995; Jessop, 1998). Very often, the city 
marketing scheme also has to rely on property projects that require massive land 
occupancy to achieve its aims (e.g. convention and shopping centres as prominent 
facets for urban regeneration, or by identifying flagship projects with local 
significance) (Harvey, 1989). A central question is why property-led development has 
become, as argued by Harvey (1988), the most common feature of city revitalization 
schemes. In answering this question, Fainstein (1994: 2, also quoted in Loftman and 
Nevin, 1996) argues that, 
 
For policy-makers, encouragement of real estate development seems to 
offer a way of dealing with otherwise intractable economic and social 
problems. Governments have promoted physical change with the 
expectations that better-looking cities are better cities…The quandary 
for local political officials is that they must depend on the private 
sector to finance most economic expansion, and they have only very 
limited tools for attracting expansion to their jurisdictions. Their heavy 
reliance on the property sector partly results from their greater ability 
to influence it than other industries.  
 
Against this global background in the study of competition, very few scholars 
in China have paid attention to inter-city competition until very recently. As a matter 
of fact, city competition is not a new phenomenon in the country. As argued by 
Huang (1996: 62), competition existed in a hidden form in the previous socialist state, 
but has become a public theme of urban governance since the 1980s. In particular, the 
growing international interests in competitive study and the desire of various localities 
in China to improve economic performance over the past few years have prompted 
searching questions about cities’ competitiveness and the “right” policy responses 
(Huang, 1996). But what is ‘competitiveness’ in Chinese context? A widely cited 
definition by the China Academy of Social Science (CASS) describes city 
competitiveness as, “The relative ability of a city in comparison with other cities to 
attract, compete for, sustain, control, and utilize [capital] resources, and the ability to 
grab and control market in order to create value for the city and provide well-off to its 
residents” (Ni, 2001: 1). This thesis of competitiveness as ‘controlling ability for 
capital’ helps to prioritize capital investors and economic efficiency over residents 
and social issues.  Local governments are keener in building the ability to magnetize 
developers (Zhao, 2002a). Cities seek to promote themselves as locations for 
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economic activities in competition with other areas. The impacts may be 
heterogeneous and unevenly experienced among different groups, such as those who 
hold capital sources and those who do not.  
 
The emergence of competitiveness building in Chinese cities is built upon the 
foundation of allowing local financial flexibility and the de-centralization of the 
power of land disposal. The greater ability of the local state in finance and land 
disposal has led to its heavy reliance on the property sector in promoting growth (Wu, 
1999, 2002; Zhu, 2004 and Zhao 2002a, 2002b). Since the economic reform in 1978, 
and especially after the land reform in 1988, local governments in China have 
increasingly seen large infrastructure projects (e.g. development zone), and property-
led development as an essential (and perhaps the only practical and readily available) 
mechanism for restructuring urban areas. They have also seen these projects as 
important city promotional devices (Yeh, 1985, Yeh and Wu, 1995; China 
Construction News, 2003). Such pro-growth approaches can play a role in developing 
economic confidence, rebuilding city images, and attracting inward investments (e.g. 
Castells and Hall, 1994). But it is also criticized for the lack of public accountability, 
social goals (Wilson, 1995: 648), and “cultural uniformity” among cities appealing to 
investors, professionals, and consumers (Harvard, 1989; Wilson, 1995). In a society 
where the local state is still under soft budget constraints (Zhao, 2002a, 2002b), a pro-
growth approach can lead to an overheated economy as a result of an over-heated 
property boom (Xu, 2004). This has called into question the validity of such an 
approach (China Construction News, 2003). 
 
Local government power and soft budget constraint: a ‘reckless tiger with wings’ 
in competitiveness building in China 
 
 The emergence of various landed interests, an empowered local government, 
and changing urban governance is a well-recognized post-reform urban condition in 
China (Oi, 1995; 2000; Wu, 2002). Fiscal reform is generally identified as a milestone 
because it has redefined the financial responsibility of central and local states, to 
allow the latter greater financial flexibility and legitimacy in managing urban 
development through residual right (Zhang, 1999). Discussing the impact of fiscal 
reform, Zhao (2002a: 8) argues that,  
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Local governments now enjoy much freedom within a clearly defined 
[financial] boundary, and are responsible for most of their own profits 
and losses; they are no longer worried that central government or other 
cities would snatch their resources away for the purpose of wealth re-
distribution; at the same time, they are supposed not to shirk off any 
loss-making activities.  
 
Central government, however, still claims certain power in limiting local 
financial activities. For instance, local governments are not allowed to directly obtain 
bank loans or raise capital through issuing bonds so that they can keep a balanced 
capital revenue and expenditure allocation.2 This restriction serves as a major trigger 
for localities to utilize policy loopholes in order to raise funds for urban development 
(see below). As a popular Chinese saying goes, “for every measure from the top, a 
countermeasure at the bottom.” In sum, changes in local government finance and 
the decentralization of central power have meant that local governments have 
shifted from a passive agency of the centre to an active promoter and manager 
of urban development.  
 
Land and housing reform is another milestone in engineering the 
changing role of local governments. After this reform, previously state-owned 
land and housing properties have become tradable products (Yeh and Wu, 
1996). In particular, “through enacting the Land Administration Law and City 
Planning Act, the state has defined the legitimate right of local governments, 
especially city governments in land development while allowing them to retain 
most income thus generated within their jurisdictions” (Zhao, 2002a: 8). In the 
arena of urban development, as de facto owners and managers of many critical 
resources (e.g. land), local governments’ programmes have gone beyond the 
search for purely provisions, to a more broad-ranging attempt to restructure 
local growth by becoming major market players. However, much freedom in 
land disposal has also produced reckless city governments that resort to discrete 
and often illegitimate land requisition, land use (Xu, 2001; Nanfeng Windows, 
2004), under-priced land leasing (Zhao, 2002a), rent-seeking, and corrupt 
behaviours (Nanfeng Windows, 2004).  This is done in order to boost their 
fortune building and inflate political performance (Ba, 2003). It is achieved 
either through direct actions or by forming coalitions, whether in the name of 
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local state corporatism (Oi, 1995), local state entrepreneurialism (Duckett, 
1998), or in ‘partnership’ with private real estate developers (Ba, 2003).  
 
The changing role of local government has been further encouraged by 
the open door policy, which allows a chance of interaction between the local 
state and overseas investors. Unlike state-owned enterprises, overseas investors 
do not follow political orders and central commands to locate their production 
or services. In particular, as a city’s client, they are footloose with much more 
locational flexibility (Zhao, 2002a); at the same time their demands for land 
resources are critical for local governments to form a competitive land market 
(Yeh and Wu, 1996). With a shrinking central budgetary allocation (Zhang, 
1999), city governments are competing with each other to attract foreign 
investors. These investors are deemed as major sources of local and extra-
budgetary income (e.g. local taxes and land income), among other benefits. The 
result has been a new style of management. Zhao (2002a) argues that there is a 
shift towards new practices, like making preferential policies that are 
customized to specific requests of foreign investors in competition with other 
localities. In general, there is a new emphasis on ‘customer (investor) care’ and 
on developing a commitment to a more ‘business friendly’ environment (Zhao, 
2002a). Besides policy stimulants, a better business environment often means a 
better looking city that provides good infrastructure. This may serve as a 
rationale behind massive urban development in Chinese cities.  
 
Empowered local state undoubtedly plays significant roles in urban 
development. It may, however, create economic and political problems. Probably one 
of the most important of these is competition and thus strong localisms in Chinese 
national politics. In the area of urban development, this has led to over-spending and 
unwise investment. An example is the Shanghai government’s deliberate decision to 
move international flights and logistics services from the old Hongqiao Airport to the 
new but outlying Pudong Airport, in an attempt to snatch investors from nearby 
cities.3 The competing activities have been reinforced by the persistence of power of 
the local state in economic affairs (Oi, 1995), since the local state has much discretion 
over the use of critical resources, such as land (Wu, 1999) and credit (Holz, 1992; Oi, 
2000). They can always find ways to circumvent central rules and regulations (Zhu, 
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2004), and create difficulties for central control. This is perhaps a problem that the 
Chinese central government has been concerned with. In addition, because the root of 
China’s society is entrenched in the previous state socialism, in which society was not 
ruled by laws but by party decree and powerful political elites, the mayor has great 
discretion in the area of urban development and planning (Xu and Ng, 1998; Xu, 
2001). Very often, it is the mayor who makes final decisions on important strategies 
and large projects.4 Furthermore, key local officials are appointed cadres. They have 
been rewarded for outstanding economic performance and physical achievement 
within their office terms. As such, they attach great importance to visual growth, both 
in economic and physical terms, to show their capabilities and to afford a chance for 
promotion in the government administration hierarchy (Zhu, 2004). For key local 
officials, urban development is less about functionality than it is about prestige (e.g. 
Cartier, 2002). Large projects are city symbols and are meant for impressing others. 
Officials are incredibly brand-conscious; many projects are designed by brand-name 
architects and planners from all around the world. These incentives in the country’s 
officialdom have been identified as one major cause of rampant inter-city competition 
in making up ambitious plans and initiating landmark projects (Ye, 2001). This has 
led to the crux of the difficulties in curbing excessive investment and over-spending 
activities (Standards, 2004).  
 
However, a central question is: how does the local state make excessive 
investment possible, and why it is not sensitive to capital costs as described by many 
observers (e.g. Xu, 2004)? The concept of soft-budget constraint may be useful to 
explain the investment activities of local governments. Soft budget constraint is often 
used to describe behavioral characteristics of firms when the strict relationship 
between expenditure (input) and earnings (output) has been relaxed (Kornai, 1986). 
These firms have two fundamental features. First, their poor performance and 
investment failures are not a matter of life and death. Second, they are not sensitive to 
cost because they lack the financial discipline that derives from the unenforceability 
of bankruptcy threats, with various bail-outs like subsidies, credits, and price supports 
(Kornai, 1986; 1992). This can be applied to explain the investment behaviors of 
Chinese local state in urban development. From the ‘output’ perspective, the failure of 
an investment project (e.g. the fancy Zhuhai International Airport fails to attract 
sufficient traffic volume) is not a matter of life and death for a city government. In 
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fact, it might be helpful in boosting local economic growth (e.g. employment and 
GDP growth) and political performance. There is no strong incentive to minimize 
large projects if funds and land are available, because large cost overruns and 
investment failures never lead to the bankruptcy of the city administration and the end 
of an office term for the mayor.  
 
From the ‘input’ perspective, local governments have a great deal of autonomy 
in disposal of two vital resources in urban development, i.e. land and finance. They 
are supposed to be self-sufficient, i.e. not only to cover expenditures from taxes and 
other revenues they are able to raise, but also to re-pay any debt that incurs. 
Unfortunately, some features of soft budget syndrome usually appear in both land and 
capital inputs. Let us examine the land element first. Under the current system, land 
income (e.g. from land leasing) or non-income benefits (e.g. from allocating land for 
face-lifting infrastructure projects and thus career advancement) are all captured by 
current city administrators during their terms in office. The negative effects of land 
shortage and misuse, the pressure of providing related infrastructure (e.g. electricity 
and road) and even compensation for land requisitions are the responsibility of 
officials during future terms in the city administration (Ba, 2003). Premiums from 
land leasing are essentially the sum of land rents for a number of years to come (Ba, 
2003), which means that at least part of land income comes from further 
governmental sources. This brings about a phenomenon in which the inefficiencies 
and shortages caused by land overruns can be covered from future public spending. In 
the case of capital ‘input’, the situation is more complicated.  
 
There are a number of ways to soften the budget constraints of local state.  
One way is through city governments’ investment arms, such as the local 
International Trust and Investment Corporation (ITIC) and the Urban Development 
Corporation These are set up to undertake infrastructure construction, and more 
importantly, to raise funds from local and global financiers for large projects 
because local governments have limitations to do so. The main dilemma 
concerning the proliferation of such agencies is their insulation from effective 
state monitoring that may cause uncontrollable local debts. There is no sufficient 
legal framework to regulate their practices, and the relationships between them and 
their sponsoring city governments have not been clearly defined. It can be reasonably 
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assumed that city governments ‘own’ and ‘operate’ these agencies, but it does not 
necessarily follow that the city governments are responsible for their debts (Emerging 
Market, 1999). For example, in the case of dealing with liquidity trouble, a city 
government may pass the trouble to the local ITIC by claiming to the creditors that 
the government has to retreat from the firm’s operation, and thus the same ITIC has to 
take care of its own problems. Behind the scenes, there are a variety of financial 
methods available to bail the firm out, such as non-reimbursable subsidies from a 
government budget and public resources, as well as bank credits.  
 
Another way to soften a local government’s budget is through various 
financiers. Assistance from these financiers plays a key role in the city’s 
competitiveness building because a local investment frenzy has often been 
reinforced by the commercialization of local banks or bank branches. 
Commercialization has enhanced the profit motives of lending operations (Jing and 
Zou, 2003), and thus helped to combine the vested interests of banks with those of the 
local governments to develop industries that would be more profitable to the localities 
(Holz, 1992; Oi, 2000). In many cases, refinancing bad projects is not uncommon 
(Sing Tao Daily, 2004). As the Chairman of the Bank of China explained, “Currently, 
almost 30% of non-performing or bad loans of banks in China are caused by unwise 
policies of various [local] governments” (Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 2004). The 
four biggest state commercial banks5 were burdened with combined bad loans 
estimated at more than a fifth of total lending, or US$232 billion (1.92 trillion RMB) 
at the end of 2003 (People’s Daily, 2004). A central question is why the 
commercialization of banks has made them less, rather than more, risk averse? 
Originally, banks simply degenerated into mere agencies of the central state, taking 
care of the financial needs of state projects designated in the national economic plans 
(Holz, 1992). They served as a tool to re-distribute resources of the central state in the 
form of policy loans, and did not have to worry about profits and repayments. 
Financial reforms in the 1980s have made local banks entrepreneurial, with three 
prominent outcomes. First, banks have to go outside the state supply channels to 
attract deposits (Oi, 2000). Second, they have to rely on lending loans for profit 
margins and recapitalization. And third, without stabilized fund supplies from the 
upper level units, they have to compete with one another in taking any available funds 
(e.g. deposit) and approving quick loan applications to depositors (Oi, 2000). Under 
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keen competition, banks will suffer if tightened loan assessment procedures lead to 
slow growth in their lending, hurting profit margins and delaying recapitalization (Wu, 
2004). In China, the annual increase in bank deposits has exceeded the growth in the 
total amount of loans for many years (Zhao, 2002b). The perceived resultant 
phenomenon is capital surplus, leading to a continuing enlarged non-profitable asset 
of banks. Banks are thus keen to release deposits in the form of loans to projects they 
consider profitable or to those supported by local governments. As one official of the 
Bank of China argued, “Projects supported by governments are often welcomed by 
banks, because very few projects of this kind have big risks in repaying loans” (Hong 
Kong Commercial Daily, 2004).6 When state banks play a role in softening the budget 
constraints of the local state, the stringency of their own budget constraints is not yet 
available. The dual roles of these banks as administrative agencies of the state and as 
economic entities allow the central government considerable leeway, and excuses in 
sparing these banks in one way or another from losing behaviours. For example, in the 
early 2004, the Bank of China and Construction Bank obtained a US$45 billion bail-
out from the central government to reduce their ratios of non-performing loans. This 
is an indirect way for local state to transfer investment risks to the central state, 
further softening the local budget in the game of competitiveness building.  
 
The above discussions seem to suggest that if the local state runs into 
financial distress, it can hope to be bailed out by exteriorizing risk and getting 
direct assistance from higher level governments. As Zhao and Zhang (2002: 73) 
have outlined with great clarity:  
 
Because of soft budget constraint and risk exteriorization 
(pressure of re-paying debts and investment risks can be 
transferred to central government through borrowing central 
bonds or bank loans and to future government administrations), 
local governments are not necessarily responsible for any 
investment loss. So, they have an extremely strong tendency to 
over-spending in order to win out in the keen inter-city 
competition.  
 
Simple economic measures, like higher interest rates, can hardly curtail local 
investment booms because if the investments are driven by a local politicians’ 
strong desire to achieve headline economic growth and career advancement, 
higher costs of capital are unlikely to do the trick before the government budget 
 14
is totally hardened (Xu, 2004). No wonder a government official in Shanghai 
laments that, “massive infrastructure-led urban growth has caused a false impression 
of local prosperity; in fact, most of these new physical configurations are sustained by 
huge government debts’.7 It may be difficult to verify the statement, but at least by 
taking all the evidences together it seems that under many circumstances, new 
strategies and competitiveness building are financial liabilities, and may divert public 
resources to face-lifting projects.  
 
Guangzhou rationale: city repositioning under intensive competition 
 
Guangzhou city presents an excellent opportunity to examine these issues of 
local government power and soft budget constraints in competitiveness building. 
Since the mid-1990s, the city has launched a series of repositioning strategies to 
revitalize its leading role in the Pearl River Delta (PRD), where perhaps the most 
intensive inter-city competition in China can be found (Figure 1).8 To most people in  
Guangzhou, the idea of devising pro-growth strategies and developing large projects 
for building competition can be perfectly justified.9 This is a city that once had a 
leading role in China, but is now consistently overshadowed by other hub cities, as 
exemplified by the gradually fading away of its role as southern gateway of China in 
history (Xu, 1985). This is a city with a glorified commercial tradition distinct from 
the rest of the country in its pioneering ability to exploit the new scope offered by the 
reform era (Xu and Yeh, 2003). This is a city wracked by the pain of urban disorders 
as revealed in the overburdened traffic (Xu and Yeh, 2003), in juxtaposition of many 
different activities and congestive high density development (Xu, 1985). This is a city 
plagued by the continuing ravages of government financial scandals, as embodied in 
the case of Guangzhou ITIC, as well as the subway project (Sina News, 2004b).  
Finally, this is a city with a palpable inequality, where many (e.g. migrant workers) 
are still fighting to make ends meet (e.g. employment and housing) (Fan, 2001; Chan, 
et al., 2003). The idea of large projects to achieve headline economic growth and to 
build up city image and competitiveness appears logical but questionable. It is for 
these reasons that the Guangzhou case is fascinating and worthy of further 
examination. However, it should be noted that despite the important insights in 
understating the widespread existence of ‘debt-burdened’ cities in China, it may not 
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be sufficient to support a generalized conclusion. More case studies need to be carried 
out in the future to further examine the arguments in this paper. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Development pressure: inter-city competition in regional development 
Guangzhou10 is one of the oldest cities in southern China, with a long history of more 
than 2,100 years. Because of its location at the northern tip of the PRD, Guangzhou 
possessed exceptional conditions as a port, and was nicknamed the “southern gate of 
China” (Xu, 1985). However, with competition from other port cities (e.g. Shanghai 
and Hong Kong), Guangzhou later declined to a port of second-rank importance. Its 
status as a trade and commercial hub was further weakened during the period from 
1949 to 1978 because of its geographic location at the coastal “front line”, having a 
very low priority in receiving state investment. The major breakthrough of urban 
development in Guangzhou came in 1979, following the nation’s new economic 
reform and “open door” policies, which placed Guangzhou in the vanguard of reform. 
The new status offered an exceptional opportunity for the city to revitalize its former 
role as a commercial centre and trading port. In particular, land and housing reform 
(Yeh and Wu, 1996) since the late 1980s has led Guangzhou into a dramatic period of 
urban development. With the backing of rapid development of industrial and service 
activities, the city soon enhanced its role as a commercial and business centre in the 
region (Lin, 2004). To keep up with development, the city built a number of major 
ring roads, highways, and railways surrounding and radiating from the city to provide 
easy access to nearby cities and distant provinces (GUPB, 2002). Guangzhou’s role as 
a transportation hub was thus affirmed (Xu and Yeh, 2003).  
 
Notwithstanding its well-established status as the commercial, business, and 
administrative centre of southern China, Guangzhou has been facing increasing 
competition from nearby cities in the PRD, where the global shift of capital has 
brought about a new geography of centres and margins, with former periphery or rural 
areas having developed into active economic centres in their own right (Sit and Yang, 
1997; Lin, 1997, 2004). To complicate this state of affairs, the return of the 
sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macao significantly challenges Guangzhou’s 
dominance. The central role of Guangzhou has been undermined, as shown by 
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indicators like its GDP share in the province, GDP per capita, export, as well as 
economic growth rate (Table 1). Worse still, the manufacturing industry of 
Guangzhou is overshadowed by that of cities like Shenzhen and Foshan (Zhang and 
Liu, 1998). Its conventional strength in service is also outshined by Hong Kong, the 
regional producer service centre (Yeh, 2003), and is increasingly being challenged by 
Shenzhen, which is right next to Hong Kong. Outside the PRD, Shanghai is perhaps 
the strongest competitor. With a tremendous effort in remaking the city as a world 
city (Wu, 2000a, 2000b), Shanghai has become an important economic and business 
centre in China, competing fiercely with cities in the PRD region in snatching 
investment and human capital (Yeh, 1996, 2001). Moreover, Shanghai’s dominance is 
still strong in the Yangtze River Delta, whereas the role of Guangzhou in the PRD is 
under severe challenge (Table 2). Guangzhou has also experienced a drop in national 
industrial ranking, from second place next only to Shanghai, to fourth or fifth after 
Suzhou, a rapidly developing industrial city in the Yangtze Delta (Mingpao, 2003b).  
 
[Table 1 & 2 about here] 
 
Urban problems have also contributed to the declining competitiveness of the 
city (Guangzhou Daily, 2002). Guangzhou’s growth is hindered by limited land 
resources (Xu and Yeh, 2003). This has forced the government to continuously 
develop the inner city. A direct outcome is intensive land development, leading to 
extremely high density-mixed land use, over-burdened traffic and infrastructure 
facilities (Gaubatz, 1999), and failures of planning control (Xu and Ng, 1998; Xu, 
2001). To relieve the traffic congestion, more elevated roads and flyovers have been 
built in the already-congested inner city. Such a type and scale of development has led 
to the degradation of the living environment. The problem has been worsened by 
widespread illegal development and the notorious lack of landscape, green belts, 
recreation facilities, and other open spaces (Xu and Ng, 1998; Xu, 2001).  
 
New development strategies: Repositioning of the city towards a regional centre 
Guangzhou residents were discontent about the city’s development. A 1997 opinion 
poll showed that 73% of the residents were dissatisfied with Guangzhou’s built 
environment (Wu and Liu, 2002: 28). The disarray of Guangzhou contrasted 
dramatically with the new progress made in Shanghai and Shenzhen (Yeh, 1996, 
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2001; Wu, 2000a, 2000b; Ng, 2004). Guangzhou might lose out to these cities unless 
immediate actions are taken to re-build its image. Evidences seem to reveal a degree 
of local support for this mindset (Wu and Liu, 2002). As the Party Secretary of 
Guangzhou, Mr. LIN Shusen said, “It is a really risky [time] for Guangzhou; since the 
city has long been proud of being the central city for more than two thousand years; if 
this status disappeared, Guangzhou would be doomed eternally” (Guangzhou Daily, 
2002).  
 
Since the late 1990s, the Guangzhou Government has taken three important 
steps to rectify its problems, trying to regain the city’s status as a regional centre. In 
the first place, Guangzhou has re-defined its strategic objective, which states that the 
city would be developed into a, “Regional centre in the world with a high level of 
prosperity, efficiency and civilization” (GUPB, 2002). This is justified by the 
statement that,  
 
Every aspect of development should contribute to the upliftment and 
quality of life of the people…but this is not the sole aim, since the core 
element of new strategies should help in the process of economic 
restructuring…to address issues created by declining role of 
Guangzhou (Nanfang Daily, 2002).  
 
Guangzhou would thus become a liveable ecological city, providing a ‘business 
friendly environment’ (GUPB, 2002). 
 
Secondly, to realize this objective, the government initiated a three-phased 
urban development strategy of, “minor change in a year, medium change in three, and 
major change in 2010.” This movement was started in 1998 with the purpose to 
promote the “greenness, amenity and attractiveness” of the city by embarking on a 
large number of face-lifting and infrastructure projects to wipe out illegal 
developments, renovate dilapidated streets and buildings, clean the environment, 
increase accessibility, and provide open space (Wu and Liu, 2002). The first phase, 
“minor change in a year (1998-1999)”, was initiated based on 109 image-improving 
projects (Shi, 2002: 59). This was taken further by the second phase, “medium change 
in three years (1999 to 2002),” which was mainly implemented through 74 major 
projects to improve the city’s transportation network and eliminate illegal 
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constructions (Guangzhou Government, 2001). In total, the city government invested 
more than US$8 billion for urban construction from 1999 to 2002 (Editor of Human 
Habitation, 2002: 9). The first two phases of the strategy have in fact made a 
difference in the restructuring of the city. Guangzhou won the 2002 Dubai 
International Award for Best Practices in Improving the Living Environment. 96% of 
local residents were satisfied with the city’s new development, a big jump over the 
results as revealed in the same opinion poll in 1997 (Wu and Liu, 2002: 28). The poll 
results have been extensively publicized by the government to an extent that one has 
the impression that the poll is being used to mobilize support and engender pubic 
consensus, and then legitimize the massive public spending yet to come.  
 
In 2002 the third phase of the new development strategy, “major change in 
2010,” started with the vision of developing the city into a liveable metropolis. In 
order to achieve this, the government pledged to invest US$9.67 billion over the next 
five years (Guangzhou News Net, 2002). A number of large property projects have 
been initiated or are under way to provide the focus of the city’s pro-growth 
strategies.11 These include large transportation projects such as the US$2.4 billion 
New Baiyun International Airport, the US$1.6 billion Nansha Deep Water Port’s two 
50,000 ton-class berths (first phase), and the US$3.24 billion Guangzhou MTR (lines 
2 & 3).  It also includes fancy face-lifting projects such as the US$500 million (land 
price not included) International Convention & Exhibition Centre, the US$123 
million Grand Opera House, the 228 km2 New City Centre, the US$1.21 billion 
International Bio-island, and the 43.3 km2 Guangzhou University Town (Figure 2). 
Other image improving efforts comprise the building of the US$484 million 
Newspaper Cultural Plaza, the US$157 million New Gymnasium, and the US$149 
million Olympics Sports Centre. In order to get international recognition quickly, 
many of these projects were simply branded by the world’s top architects and 
planners, and the Guangzhou Government made full use of these architects’ 
‘signatures’ to achieve broader urban significance. For example, the new airport was 
designed by American Parsons, the convention centre by LMN Architects, the new 
gymnasium by French Paul Andreu Architect, and the Olympics centre by American 
NEB. A celebrated example of hosting mega-events is the Guangzhou Trade fair. 
Without exception, all of these projects were initiated by the Guangzhou Government. 
Take the Nansha Deep Water Port as an example. Nansha is not the most desirable 
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site for building a deep-water port because of sea sedimentation. The building of the 
port was originally envisioned by the mayor of Guangzhou for the purpose of 
competing with the fast-growing Yantian Port in Shenzhen.12 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The third, but not least, step taken by the Guangzhou Government was to 
redraw its administrative boundary by adjusting Huadu and Panyu from the status of 
county-level cities to districts.13 Following the reorganization, the area under the 
direct administration of the city government was increased from 1,400 km2 to 3,719 
km2 (Xu and Yeh, 2003), which enriched the local land bank and alleviated 
development pressure within the congested city proper (GUPB, 2002). After this, 
Guangzhou took the initiative to prepare a new Concept Plan, which highlighted the 
city’s new development goals, spatial structure, population, and transportation.  Its 
purpose was to build Guangzhou into a regional centre and a producer service centre 
with the development of finance, science and technology, information, trade and 
commerce, transportation, culture, and tourism.14 These strategies are legitimized by 
the local authority in terms of increasing competition and revitalizing the central role 
of Guangzhou – a view frequently articulated by the mayor and local public agencies 
(e.g. GUPB, 2002; Guangzhou Daily, 2002; Mingpao, 2003a).  
 
There is no question that competition was the key part of the rationale and 
ideology for the new strategies. But rationales can also be an excuse for other 
objectives, which remain more or less hidden in the face of competitive rhetoric. 
Guangzhou’s massive fixed-asset investment is only a small part of the wider 
response to the worldwide economic slowdown after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 
which caused difficulty in sustaining an export-led growth in many Chinese cities 
(Zhao, 2002b). In response, there has been a shift in the government’s strategy, from 
export-led industrialization (which focuses attention on promoting exportation to 
sustain high growth rate) to strategies that are geared to promote domestic demand 
through public investment. Government spending has thus become the engine of 
growth (Xu, 2004). Wu and Liu (2002:35) argue that it is Guangzhou’s fixed-asset 
investment, especially investment in urban construction, which has contributed 
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greatly to the city’s GDP performance. This is why Guangzhou can remain among the 
top three cities in China in terms of economic strength.  
 
Urban outcome 
 
Building city image and luring investment: success or failure? 
The perceived success of new development strategies in rebuilding a city’s image has 
been widely acclaimed by the local and national media and some academic 
commentators (Xu and Yeh, 2003; Pan et al, 2004). One commentator claimed that 
the transformation of Guangzhou’s image in just a few years, from a cluttered-market-
like city to a community that re-gained its former eminence as the ‘flower city’, is a 
remarkable story of local government commitment and public support (Wu and Liu, 
2002). The citizens are benefiting from the improvements in traffic, landscape, and 
living environment.  Prior to 1999, for example, of all the daunting challenges the city 
faced, perhaps none was more pressing than the urgent need to enhance the mobility 
of citizens. At the time, traffic congestion was so bad that vehicles could only move at 
a speed of 10 km/hr (Wu and Liu, 2002). Now, with large investment in road 
construction, mobility has been greatly improved, and vehicles can run as fast as 50 
km/hr in the inner city (Wu and Liu, 2002: 27). The opinion poll in Guangzhou 
reverted from 73% of the residents who were dissatisfied with Guangzhou’s built 
environment in 1997, to 96% who were satisfied with the city’s new development in 
2003. In the 2001 International ‘Garden City’ Contest, Guangzhou won third place in 
Group E, with a population above one million, and was awarded the title of 
international ‘garden city’.  
 
Another concern is whether the promotion of these strategies can succeed in 
attracting a large quantity of mobile capital. The government claims that the 
accumulated sum of foreign capital from 1997 to 2002 represented 61.51% of the total 
since the economic reform, and that 115 transnational corporations among the world’s 
top 500 have built branches in Guangzhou (GOCN, 2003a; Guangzhou Government 
Press Conference, 2004). The city also shows sign of success in transforming the 
economy. For example, it has become one of three major convention and exhibition 
centers in China, together with Shanghai and Beijing. However, it will take more time 
to see the long term effects in attracting investment.  
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Soft budget constrain in developing large projects and the validity of these projects 
Budgetary revenue, extra-budgetary revenue, and loans constitute three basic sources 
of government spending in Guangzhou (Shen, 1999).15 The former two cannot 
provide sufficient capital for large projects like the Guangzhou Subway (Sina News, 
2004b). In securing finance, the city has to utilize a number of agencies such as the 
Guangzhou International Trust and Investment Corporation (GZITIC) and the 
Guangzhou Construction Investment and Development Corporation (GZCIDC), two 
important borrowing arms of the city government. They are entrusted and appointed 
by the government to undertake functions like investing, fund-raising, and managing 
state-owned property within a certain degree of discretion (Shen, 1999; 21st Century 
Business Herald, 2003). The chain of control from the central government is weak. 
Therefore, through setting up these investment arms under its auspice, the city 
government has obtained substantial discretionary power in collecting funds. But 
what is the validity of investing large projects in this way? How has it softened the 
budget constraint of the city government in large-scale investment? 
 
Take the GZITIC as an example. GZITIC was set up in 1985 to imitate the 
China ITIC, the first and biggest of such vehicles in China. Originally, it was 
established by the city government to fund long-term development for infrastructure 
projects such as industries, roads, power plants, housing properties, and tourism 
(Guangzhou Government, 2004). At that time, foreign bankers were not allowed to 
lend directly to mainland companies, and lending by China's state banks was 
restricted to state enterprises (Emerging Market, 1999). GZITIC had foreign exchange 
certificates approved by China's central bank, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), 
and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) (Guangzhou Government, 
2004). This was the only way to invest. With the backing of the city government, 
GZITIC was able to diversify into more than 20 subsidiaries, including securities 
brokerages, international trade, hotels, other property investment, as well as joint 
ventures with local companies that had a government background (21st Century 
Business Herald, 2003; Guangzhou Government, 2004). Furthermore, despite not 
being licensed as a commercial bank, GZITIC also took deposits from local 
depositors by offering high interest rates above the legal rate set by the central bank 
(Xie, 2000). Without effective legal and financial limitation, GZITIC was used 
extensively by the Guangzhou Government as a borrowing arm to finance 
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government projects. Against US$726 million (6 billion RMB) in assets, the firm 
holds liabilities to foreign banks and creditors exceeding US$1 billion, with a further 
US$1.71 billion in domestic liabilities, owed to more than 200 banks and creditors 
(21st Century Business Herald, 2003). The overseas creditors mainly come from 
Hong Kong, with the Guangzhou Government and Guangzhou SAFE serving as two 
guarantees (Xie, 2000). To keep the ailing GZITIC afloat, Guangzhou was allowed to 
bail out the firm by injecting blue-chip properties and spending US$362 million from 
public funding to pay its hard-currency liabilities (21st Century Business Herald, 
2003). Part of the bail-out fund came from the central government in the form of 
loans. Some argued that the strategy of Guangzhou, in paying its debt, was to get new 
loans to pay current creditors (Sina News, 2004c). GZITIC was opaque to the 
domestic and overseas banks and investors, who lent it money; the Guangzhou 
Government, who owned it; the central authority, who was supposed to regulate it; 
and even to the general public, who contributed to it as depositors. A massive amount 
of money was lost through bad investment, mismanagement, and even theft (Xie, 
2002). In the heightened pressure of financial distress, one deputy mayor went to 
Hong Kong and explained to creditors that the Guangzhou Government could not 
make re-payment for GZITIC because the latter was an independent firm bearing its 
own debts. But on the same day, another deputy mayor hosted a meeting in 
Guangzhou discussing how to reconfigure GZITIC’s structure (Xu, 2004).  
 
In addition to uncontrollable government spending, unlawful land requisition, 
and land disputes, large projects were not uncommon. An example is the prominent 
Guangzhou University Town. It is an ongoing US$1.44 billion (12 billion RMB) 
project, covering 43.4 km2 with the claimed purpose to become the largest project of 
its kind in China in order to promote education and attract more talented people 
(GUPB, 2002). The Town is situated in Xiaoguwei, which is a fertile farmland region 
where the natural environment and ancient relics remain well preserved. To bypass 
the central authority, the Guangzhou government decided to subdivide the area into 
39 pieces, and sent land requisition applications of each piece to the provincial 
government for approval (Sina News, 2004a).16 The possibly unlawful pursuit of 
University Town is a response to a national fever of university town construction, 
which has sparked concern about the validity and effect of hasty large projects that 
cause financial crisis and social problems (Market Daily, 2004). The blind 
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development of university towns, such as those in Zhuhai and Hangzhou, could mean 
unhealthy land abuse (Mingpao, 2005). It is most likely that the Guangzhou 
government and developers used the project as a cover for boosting economic growth 
and developing commercial facilities, since it is usually easier to justify and get 
approval for education-related projects (Market Daily, 2004). On top of this, land can 
be bought at lower prices in this way (e.g. Mingpao, 2005).  
 
Who have actually benefited from this project? As far as the city government 
is concerned, the project has boosted local esteem and promoted GDP growth, as well 
as advanced local politicians’ careers (China Information Centre, 2004). To 
requisition land, the city government paid US$5,430-9,075 per ha (30,000 to 50,000 
RMB per mu) to displaced farmers (Market Daily, 2004). In 2003, three pieces of 
land were leased to commercial developers with auction price as high as US$4.5-9.1 
million per ha (2.5-5 million RMB per mu) (Sina News, 2004a). For universities 
(developers in this case) that will move to the University Town, the government has 
decided on US$1.45 billion (12 billion RMB) in discount loans (mostly bank loans), 
and universities will pay the principal, while the government provides free land and 
pays the interests as subsidies (GOCN, 2003b). Clearly, this large project entails 
massive financial cost, which has been at least partially underwritten by the public 
sector. For commercial and other land developers, the project is also good news since 
the city government has to rely on their investment to build ancillary facilities and 
properties (e.g. supermarket, hotels, and office buildings) (Market Daily, 2004). For 
residents of the Xiaoguwei district, where the University Town is located, the project 
means more disturbances than benefits. More than 10,000 farmers were dislocated 
(Sina News, 2004a), while the remaining farmers grieve the ecological loss the project 
has caused (Market Daily, 2004). A group of residents have filed a lawsuit against the 
city government after being forced to move from their legal properties, which were 
built with government-approved land use permits in 1994 (Sina News, 2004a).  
 
Large projects often divert scare public sector resources away from ‘basic’ 
services that the city’s disadvantaged groups are particularly dependent upon. This is 
exemplified by the US$109 million Guangzhou Pension Fund (Ju, 2004) and the 
US$18 million Local Education Fund (Dayang News, 2003) that were diverted by 
public agencies to develop large property projects, or deposited in GZITIC to generate 
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high interest rates. Another example is the controversy about the Guangzhou Opera 
House. The government claims the opera house will be a new expressive icon that 
integrates with urban strategy to create new cultural significance to the city. Delegates 
of the local People’s Congress question this expensive and hasty project, and call a 
halt to it because it would further divert resources away from hard-pressed local 
services, such as rebuilding deprived neighbourhood schools in the inner city. The 
government has ignored this school problem for a long time due to the claim of lack 
of funding (Yangcheng Daily, 2000). This diversion of capital will have a 
disproportionate long-term impact upon the disadvantaged in the city. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since the 1980s, Chinese cities have seen increased competition for mobile 
capital. This is built upon the foundation of an open door policy that allows foreign 
participation in urban development. With great reduction in funding from the central 
government, localities now have to go outside formal state channels to raise funds in 
many forms. In particular, overseas capital has become an important form of 
investment in promoting local growth. To attract overseas investors (e.g. 
multinational enterprises), which are highly mobile in considering the locations of 
their plants and offices, cities increasingly have to take on an ‘entrepreneurial’ stance 
in promoting growth and marketing themselves, and to compete with other localities 
in attracting capital in promoting economic development. As such, they are under 
increasing pressure to initiate physical change and to create ‘resources’ to make cities 
more attractive to investors. This has led to the creation of league tables of city’s 
competitiveness, in which rankings are determined by single or multiple variables 
related to capital and resources. These resources are further defined in relation to 
infrastructure development, institutional set-up, social and cultural amenities, and 
physical attractiveness, which are all so easy to imitate. Thus, competition has to be 
about the differences in image (Zhai et. al, 2004). The fear of diminishing importance 
and declining rank of cities in regional development intensifies the competition for 
mobile capital and image re-construction that are believed to have considerable 
economic multiplier effects. Economic reforms (e.g. financial and land reform) enable 
local state in China to find funding to fund mega-infrastructure projects to build the  
competitiveness of the city, because these reforms allow greater ability of local state 
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in financing and land disposal. With two critical resources (capital and land) that are 
more easily available to localities than before, the idea of harnessing large projects to 
a broad urban agenda is becoming extremely popular in Chinese cities. Local 
governments have adopted pro-growth strategies, focused on large projects as a means 
of promoting economic development and projecting new and dynamic city images to 
promote competitiveness.  
 
Adding to the tempestuous upsurge of competitiveness building, government 
officials, especially mayors, are also stimulated to develop large projects for their own 
career advancement. They are appointed cadres who are assessed for promotion on 
the basis of political loyalty and ‘merit-based’ factors, as indicated by economic 
performance and ‘achievement in office’. The physical form of a built environment 
such as city square, a fly over area, metro-mass-transit, and a development zone, by 
their nature, is easier to use in visualizing achievement than ‘intangible’ social 
development (Wu, 2005). The pursuit of physical transformation is also highly 
facilitated by the ‘soft budget constraint syndrome’ of local state in urban 
development. Any loss-making investment is not a matter of life and death. A debt-
burdened city never leads to bankruptcy or an end of the office term of key cadres. 
Rather, debt may be helpful for these cadres in climbing up the political ladder. 
During his term in office from 1993-2001, Mr. BO Xilai, the former mayor of Dalian 
in the Liaoning Province, transformed Dalian from a pollution-plagued city to one 
that has been highly acclaimed by local residents. Its broad boulevards are lined with 
trees, manicured gardens, squares, and parks. Traffic flows smoothly. Dust levels are 
low despite considerable construction work. But beneath the astonishing 
transformation is the debt-burdened local finance.17 For example, Dalian ITIC 
defaulted on US$140 million in foreign debt. But Mr. Bo has been largely untainted 
by the ITIC failure. He was appointed as Deputy Governor and Acting Governor of 
the Liaoning Province in January 2001. In February of the same year, he became the 
Governor of the Liaoning Province. In February 2004, he was further appointed the 
Minister of Commerce, and has held the position since.  
 
China is by no means a ‘ruled by law’ society. Local cadres are not elected 
officials, like their counterparts in many countries in the West. Empowered local state 
can lead to unscrupulous local officials running the city administration. In building 
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competitiveness, such operations of the state may involve activities more fundamental 
than ‘using preferential taxes and providing subsidies’ to compete with one another 
and to attract and retain businesses. The local state can go beyond its legal and 
budgetary constraints, as well as market logic to recklessly mobilize resources. This 
defines one fundamental parameter of local state in China, and helps us to re-think 
two important issues in current theoretical debates. The first issue is about urban 
entrepreneurialism in China. With a local state not considering ‘market logic’, it is 
questionable to say that the state is ‘entrepreneurial’ in nature. The second issue 
relates to the role of the state, as compared with those in the coalition politics 
described by theories (e.g. growth machine) originating in some Western countries. 
Chinese states, as market players and regulators, have more complicated ultimate 
goals than ‘growth’. ‘Growth’ might sometimes be rhetoric – an excuse for other 
hidden agendas at the expense of true growth impetus in a city in the long run.  
Moreover, Chinese society is far from being pluralist. Despite the widespread 
encouragement of public-private partnership and the participation of external (non-
public) capital in local growth, urban development is by no means a process that can 
be led by non-state developers. Since the state holds two critical resources, capital and 
land, large-scale urban projects such as civic centres, concert halls, industrial parks, 
and mass-transit systems are most likely instigated by the state. To initiate or 
coordinate these projects is a complicated ‘social engineering’ project (Wu, 2002). 
These projects, by their nature, are concerned with the recreation and reconfiguration 
of space. Furthermore, the processes involved, such as acquisition of collective 
farmland, arrangement of relocated residents, and usage of credits for getting loans, 
requires the input of local governments who tend to replace the market and 
monopolize political and social resources that are not available to other market actors 
(Wu, 2005). Thus, the role of the ‘appointed’ local state in China is different from 
those ‘elected’ states in advanced capitalism, which often seek ‘growth’ in the context 
of coalition politics that operate in highly pluralist societies with strong social 
mobility power.  
 
The outcome of competitiveness building in Chinese cities can be twofold. On 
the one hand, competitive strategies present the opportunity for a locality to 
strengthen its competition and attractiveness among cities. The Guangzhou case 
shows that how much these strategies actually stimulate business and lure investment 
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in the long term has yet to be seen. The citizens at large are immediately and directly 
benefiting from the improved living environment, and thus these projects have gained 
much popularity and support. There are also signs of success of Guangzhou in 
transforming the economy. But whether or not the initial success of these 
‘repositioning strategies’ can continue is still a difficult question to answer, because 
Guangzhou is not the only city in China trying to build a world-class city with 
international standards. Eighty-six Chinese cities have formulated plans to develop 
themselves into “international metropolitan cities” (People, 2002). Infrastructure-led 
development can be found in cities within the Pearl River Delta, such as Hong Kong, 
Shenzhen, Foshan, and Dongguan, and in cities in other parts of China such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing. In addition to big cities, small cities and towns in 
China, especially those in the booming eastern coastal provinces, are also keen in 
competitiveness building. This is understandable, because every locality knows the 
importance of increasing its competitiveness in order to attract footloose investment 
and to face increasing competition within China as well as from abroad.  
 
On the other hand, ‘competitiveness building’ in Chinese cities creates 
externalities. Perhaps the most critical one of these is the validity of a local state’s 
approach to building competitiveness and subsequent urban outcomes. Problems such 
as ‘debt-burdened’ local finance, the miseries of dislocated farmers and residents, and 
the misuse of public resources are not as visible as a city’s physical transformation. 
Government officials are not assessed based on these criteria. Moreover, the ability of 
the local state in fund-raising for large projects is now mainly built upon the ‘soft 
budget constraint’ syndrome.  To a large extent, these projects are not the outcomes of 
entrepreneurial governance, but big gambles that may succeed or fail. Take Shanghai 
and Zhuhai as examples. In the early development of Pudong in the mid-1990s, there 
were sceptics on how to fill the massive development (Haila 1999). But now a large 
percentage of these earlier vacancies are filled because of the economic bloom in 
Shanghai. It is not so lucky in the case of Zhuhai.  Zhuhai also had an ambitious 
development plan that led to the building of an international airport. But the expected 
economic development and foreign investment did not come and now the Zhuhai 
government is in big debt.  Competitiveness building and place-making exists in most 
cities in the world, but the scale and speed of Chinese cities in doing these may be 
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unmatched. This will be continued to be the case, given the political economy of the 
government structure and soft budgeting system in Chinese cities.    
 
Large projects that entail massive financial costs and heighten capital liability 
will always appear risky, especially when many local governments are debt-burdened 
per se. This is particularly so given the pressure of funding the debt charges 
associated with large projects; these have exacerbated the financial crisis faced by 
local governments (Chang, 2001). From a political economy point of view, large 
projects are mostly undertaken at the will of local politicians, who know how to take 
advantage of social inefficiencies (e.g. soft budget constraints), circumventing central 
regulations while ignoring ‘welfare provisions’ or other ‘basic needs’ of the 
disadvantaged. Harvey (1989) once argued that such projects could be a source of 
urban instability and malaise, in particular when they are inherently speculative in 
execution and the risk is to a large extent borne by the ‘public’. Inter-city competition 
might be an excuse for construction and the enhancement of property values, rather 
than the amelioration of the conditions of the city. Competitiveness building involves 
primarily two elite groups in Chinese cities: the local government and commercial 
interests. The local government, especially top government officials, sees the potential 
for expanding economic growth and opportunities for career advancement. The 
commercial interests (e.g. financiers) see the opportunities for rent seeking and 
broadening the material gains through land transformation. Both elites tend to use city 
physical change, led by land development, to secure their gains through quick and 
visible actions that may generate considerable public controversy and diverge public 
spending from basic services for the disadvantaged. As such, the new strategies are 
not as they are portrayed by their advocates: they are not in the unitary interest of 
cities, and not everyone gain from enhanced local prosperity.  
 
 
 
Footnote: 
 
* Conversion factor: US$1= RMB 8.27 
 
[1]. Porter's diamond-model (Porter, 1990) is a model of regional competitiveness. It 
identifies four geographical development determinants that contribute to regional 
competitive capabilities: (1) factor (input) conditions; (2) demand conditions; (3) 
related and supporting industries; and (4) context for firm strategy and rivalry. 
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These four determinants mutually reinforce one another and the interactions 
within a region.  
 
[2]. According to the Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China (Article 28), the 
local budgets at various levels shall be compiled according to the principles 
of keeping expenditures within the limits of revenues, and maintaining a 
balance between revenues and expenditures. They shall not contain deficit. 
The law further stipulates that local governments may not issue local 
bonds, except as otherwise prescribed by laws or the State Council. 
 
[3]. The Shanghai Government has moved most international flights and logistics 
facilities from the old Hongqiao Airport to the Pudong Airport, which is very far 
from the city and regional centre. As a result, firms in nearby cities like Suzhou 
and Wuxi have to spend one more hour than before to use the Pudong Airport. 
The decision to move services to the Pudong Airport is a deliberate policy of 
Shanghai to keep its competitiveness as a regional magnet to attract foreign 
capital. In the short term, this may make Shanghai more attractive because it is 
more accessible to critical producer and logistics services. But in the long run, 
the policy may not boost Shanghai’s role as a regional service centre because it 
has forced nearby cities to review their plans to build their own new airports. (Li, 
Zhu and Chen, 2003). 
 
[4]. There are ample examples. One author of this paper once worked as a planning 
consultant for the Yuxi City Government in the Yunnan Province to devise a 
concept plan for the city. Large infrastructure projects suggested in the final 
scheme are all originated from the mayor. These include, among others, a new 
city centre and a fancy concert hall.  
 
[5]. The so called “big four” refers to the Bank of China, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, the Construction Bank of China, and the 
Agricultural Bank of China. 
 
[6]. An example is the recent case of Tieben Steel and Iron Company. With the 
backing of local governments and state-owned financial institutions, Jiangsu 
Tieben (in Changzhou) circumvented rules and regulations governing loans and 
investments. The company had US$72.55 million (600 million RMB) in 
registered capital. However, six financial institutions, including three of the big 
four state commercial banks, enabled it to fund investment projects totaling 
US$1.3 billion (10.6 billion RMB) (Wu, 2004). 
 
[7]. This is from a telephone interview with a government official in Shanghai, in 
May 2003. 
 
[8]. Five among the top ten most competitive cities in China are located in the 
Greater Pearl River Delta (PRD) Region, which consists of the PRD in Mainland 
China, Hong Kong, and Macao (Li, Zhu and Chen, 2003). They are Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Dongguan, Hong Kong, and Macao.  
 
[9]. This is based on a telephone interview with a government official in the 
Guangzhou Construction Commission, conducted on 7 July 2004. 
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[10]. For a detailed description on physical and administrative characters of 
Guangzhou, please refer to Xu and Yeh (2003). Guangzhou, in this study, refers 
to the whole Guangzhou Municipality, which includes ten city districts and two 
county-level cities. 
 
[11]. For detailed information on these projects, please refer to Xu and Yeh (2003). 
 
[12]. From an interview with an official in the Guangzhou Port Authority, in May 
2003. 
 
[13]. The redrawn administrative boundary is approved and backed by the central 
government. 
 
[14]. For more information on the new concept plan, please refer to GUPB (2002) and 
Xu and Yeh (2003). 
 
[15]. The importance of the non-public sector in urban infrastructure construction has 
also grown continuously in recent years because more and more functions 
previously performed by local governments (e.g. water supply and bridges) are 
now being allocated to non-public investors through transferring development 
rights and listing companies since the 1990s (Shen, 1999). However, our paper 
focuses mainly on the leading role of local governments in financing large 
infrastructure projects.  
 
[16]. According to the Land Administration Act of China, any requisition of Basic 
Agricultural Land, no matter how small, requires approval by the State Council. 
Any requisition of other arable land over 35 hectares, or non-arable land over 70 
hectares, also needs authorization from the State Council.  
 
[17]. This is based on an interview with a government official from the Ministry of 
Construction of the People’s Republic of China, conducted on 27 November 
2005 in Hong Kong.  
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 Table 1: The declining role of Guangzhou in the rapidly developing Pearl River Delta region 
 
  Years Land area 
(km2) 
% in 
PRD's 
total 
Registered 
Population     
(million) 
% in PRD's 
total 
GDP (US$ 
billion)* 
 
% in 
PRD's total
GDP 
growth 
rate (%) 
Export
(US$
billion)
Pearl River Delta 1990 41,698 100.0% 19.3 100.0% 10.54 100% 17.8 8
  1995 41,698 100.0% 21.4 100.0% 47.16 100% 20.3 46
  2001 41,698 100.0% 23.4 100.0% 101.14 100% 12.7 90
Guangzhou 1990 7,434 17.8% 5.9 30.6% 3.87 37% 14.2 1
  1995 7,434 17.8% 6.4 29.9% 15.03 32% 16.4 9
  2001 7,434 17.8% 7.1 30.3% 32.48 32% 12.7 11
Shenzhen 1990 1,949 4.7% 2.0 10.4% 2.08 20% 38.1 3
  1995 1,949 4.7% 3.5 16.4% 9.63 20% 23.0 20
  2001 1,949 4.7% 4.7 20.1% 23.63 23% 13.2 37
Zhuhai 1990 1,457 3.5% 0.8 4.1% 0.50 5% 24.7 0
  1995 1,457 3.5% 1.1 5.1% 2.24 5% 16.3 2
  2001 1,457 3.5% 1.3 5.6% 4.43 4% 12.1 3
Dongguan 1990 2,465 5.9% 1.3 6.7% 0.79 7% 17.8 0
  1995 2,465 5.9% 1.4 6.5% 2.49 5% 25.3 7
  2001 2,465 5.9% 1.5 6.4% 7.00 7% 18.0 18
Foshan 1990 3,865 9.3% 2.8 14.5% 1.51 14% 22.0 0
  1995 3,865 9.3% 3.4 14.5% 5.27 11% 22.0 3
  2001 3,865 9.3% 3.4 14.5% 12.91 13% 11.1 6
Note: GDP growth rate in 1990 for all geographic units are average figures for the period 1981 to 1994 
Sources: Guangdong Statistics Bureau (various years).  
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Table 2: Guangzhou and Shanghai: a comparison of their role in the regional economy (with 
selected cities)# 
        
Guangzhou in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) 2001     
 
Guangzhou 
(GZ) PRD 
% of GZ 
in PRD Shenzhen Zhongshan Dongguan Foshan 
Land area (km2) 7,434 41,698 17.8% 1,949 1,800 2,465 3,914
Registered Pop. 
(million) 7.13 23.37 30.5% 4.68 1.34 1.54 3.35
GDP (US$ 
billion) 32.48 101.14 32.1% 23.63 4.38 7.00 12.91
GDP Per Capita 
(US$) 4,147 3,753 - 5,241 2,847 3,927 3,498
Export (US$ 
billion) 11.6 90.83 12.8% 37.5 4.36 18.9 6.35
Utilized Foreign 
Capital (US$ 
billion) 3.33 14.19 23.5% 3.6 0.74 1.8 1.01
        
Shanghai in the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) 2001     
  
Shanghai 
(SH) 
Yangtze 
River Delta 
(YRD) 
% of SH 
in YRD Wuxi Suzhou Nanjing Ningpo 
Land area (km2) 6,341 100,113 6.3% 4,650 8,488 6,598 9,365
Registered Pop. 
(million) 13.27 74.94 17.7% 4.36 5.8 5.53 5.43
GDP (US$ 
billion) 59.85 103.87* 57.6% 16.45 21.28 13.91 15.86
GDP Per Capita 
(US$) 4,520 2,056* - 3,778 3,674 2,491 2,928
Export (US$ 
billion) 27.6 73.6 37.5% 3.6 12.3 5.75 6.2
Utilized Foreign 
Capital (US$ 
billion) 4.4 16.06 27.4% 1.36 3.02 0.95 0.874
 
*Estimated figure based on 2000 figure in the 2001 Statistic Yearbook for Chinese Counties (Cities) 
 
Sources: Guangdong Statistic Bureau (2002); ChinaInfoBank (2004); Shanghai Statistics Bureau 
(2002); and Enright, et al. (2003). 
 
